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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
appears between the law of real property and the law of
personal property. The law of finders requires the land owner
to take through his prior possession of the chattel. The inter-
vener-remainderman was never in possession of the Haney
farm; and, consequently, could never have had prior possession
of the canoe. Under the doctrine of Elwes v. Briggs, as it is
normally applied by the courts, the plaintiffs, as assignees of
the life tenant, should recover. However, if the principles
applicable to the life tenant-remainderman relationship are used,
an opposite result would be reached.
The practical results in the instant case are not unfair. The
important relationship of life tenant-remainderman may have
been preferred to the special rules of the law of finders. Also
the court may have wished to settle the conflict between finder
and landowner, whether life tenant or remainderman, in accord
with the concepts of personal property; and then, with these
claims quieted, proceed to settle the interests between life
tenant and remainderman on the basis of real property law.
However, it did not mark this approach with sufficient clarity 4
to avoid the confusion arising from the fact that the Elwes
case contained a basic element (prior possession) which was
not present in the instant case.
FRANK M. MAYFIELD, JR.
TORTS-APPLICABILITY OF CRIMINAL STATUTE IN CIVIL CASE-
WHAT CONSTITUTES BREACH OF STATUTE. In a recent Minnesota
case,' a mining company was held liable for injuries sustained
in an accident occurring on the highway below its railroad
bridge. Ore falling from the railroad cars had partially
obscured a sign warning of the bridge. The bridge, used
exclusively by the mining company for transportation of its
ore, was supported by a pier, in the middle of the highway.
Signs had been erected on the bridge itself to warn of the pier,
but in the use of the bridge, ore had fallen out of the cars
onto the bridge and the rain had caused a mud-like mixture
14. "We have found no case wherein the doctrine announced in Elwes
v. Briggs has been criticized. It rests upon sound principles, is logical,
and should 'be the law in this jurisdiction." Alfred v. Biegel, 219 S.W.2d
665, 666 (Mo. App. 1949).
1. Robinson et al. v. Duluth, M. & L R. Ry., 38 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1949).
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to drip down onto the sign. One snowy night a car, in which
plaintiffs were passengers, struck the pier. The plaintiffs
claimed that the sign was so obscured that the driver couldn't
see it.
A Minnesota statute provided:
No person shall, without lawful authority, attempt to or
in fact alter, deface, injure, knock down or remove any
official traffic control device or any railroad sign or any
signal or any inscription, shield or insignia thereon, or
any part thereof.-
The court justified the jury's finding that the drippings from
the ore cars of the defendant so smeared the warning sign as
to be a contributing cause of the driver's failure to see and
avoid the pier. This, they held, was a violation of the statute,
and of itself prima facie evidence of negligence. But, said the
court, even without the statute, it would have been common
law negligence, as the obscuring of the sign showed a lack of
ordinary care.
The statute involved in the case is a criminal one. However,
civil liability may extend to the violation of a criminal statute
where the plaintiff is one of the class of persons whom the
statute was designed to protect, and the injury was the kind
the statute was designed to prevent.3 Here, there is no doubt
that users of the highway were among the group of persons
intended to be protected by the statute, and further that the
statute was intended to prevent the very type of injury which the
plaintiff sustained. Therefore, civil liability should attach
for injury arising out of the violation of the statute here
involved, if the statute is applicable at all in a civil case.
Hence, the question arises, did the mining company violate
the Minnesota statute? To answer this, the aspect of intent
arises. It is a well established principle of law that unless the
statute is such as to do away with intent, the act must be
accompanied by an intent to commit the act.4 Therefore, one
must ask, what intent is required by the statute?
Malice is sufficient to supply the necessary intent, but there
must be an intentional act intended to cause harm. This is
2. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.08 (1939).
3. PRossER, TORTS 264 (1941).
4. State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 118 P.2d 280 (1941); MILLER,
CRIMINAL LAw 52-67 (1934).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss2/10
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commonly called specific intent in regards to criminal acts.
Had the mining company deliberately defaced the warning sign,
it would, without a doubt, be liable for all the consequences of
its act. However, the facts of the case fail to show such an
intent on the part of the defendant. Usually statutes requiring
such an intent include the words "knowingly" or "willfully."
Normally, a bare general intent is sufficient to establish lia-
bility, except in those cases where specific or other particular
intent is required. That is, the mere intent to do the act which
results in the end effect of said act, supplies the intent for the
end result. Here a distinction exists between criminal guilt
and tortious liability. In connection with criminal guilt, general
intent has been defined thus:
When a person capable of entertaining criminal intent,
acting without justification or excuse, commits an act,
prohibited as a crime, his intention to commit the act
constitutes criminal intent. In such cases the existence
of the intent is presumed from commission of the act, on
the ground that a person is presumed to intend his volun-
tary acts and their natural and probable consequences.5
This definition is applied to those acts which the person com-
mitting them knows are wrong-such as firing a gun into a
crowd. Thus, such a general criminal intent can't be found
here, as there is nothing inherently wrong about operating a
railroad, nor any reckless disregard for the safety of others.
In certain instances, the state of mind requirement may be
met by proving a negligent act or omission. Such negligence
must be gross and consist of reckless or indifferent omission
to do what a reasonable person would do. In these instances,
there must be a duty owing, the person must know of the duty,
and the negligent act must cause the injury.
The one exception to the rule that either intent or criminal
negligence is necessary in order to establish the violation of
a criminal statute is found in those statutes which completely
dispense with any state of mind requirement.7 In such instances
the lack of any state of mind requirement should be clearly
expressed in the statute. Such statutes are ordinarily enacted
only where the prohibited activity is inherently likely to be
5. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw 57 (1934).
6. Id. at 66.
7. Id. at 72.
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detrimental to public welfare,8 for example, the selling of
unwholesome food for human consumption; or where conveni-
ence of administration and difficulty of proof make a state of
mind requirement impractical.' Such a statute in effect imposes
strict liability, for proof of the commission of the act alone
establishes its violation."
Turning to the statute in the instant case, it seems clear that
if that statute contains any state of mind requirement in order
for a criminal offense to be proved, it was not violated in this
case. There was clearly no specific nor general intent to deface
the sign, nor was there any evidence of criminal negligence.
The Minnesota court seems to say that there was no necessity
for proving any particular state of mind in order to establish
violation of the statute. In arriving at that conclusion, the
court relied heavily on the following language in the statute:
No person shall ... attempt to or in fact alter"1 ... [italics
added]
The court concluded that the words "in fact" indicated that
the legislative intent was that anytime a sign was in fact
defaced, etc., by a voluntary act on the part of a human being,
that person was guilty of a criminal offense. It is submitted
that a more logical construction would be to say that the legis-
lature intended to make it an offense not only actually to deface
(intentionally), but also to attempt to deface signs of this
type. 2
Certainly there is nothing inherently dangerous about running
ore cars over an overhead bridge, and it would not seem that
8 State v. Dombroski, 145 Minn. 278, 176 N.W. 985 (1920).
9. United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437 (1943).
10. People v. Player, 377 fI1. 417, 36 N.E.2d 729 (1941); PROSSER, TORTS
467 (1941).
11. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.08 (1939).
12. An Arkansas statute, which is almost identical to the Minnesota
statute, has a further provision which would seem to require specific in-
tent for a violation thereof:
"(a) No person shall without lawful authority, attempt to or in fact
alter, deface, mutilate, injure, knock down, destroy or remove any official
highway traffic control device, road marker, lighting equipment or any
railroad crossing sign or signal, or any inscription, shield or transcription
thereon, or any part thereof. It is a misdemeanor for any person or per-
sons to violate any of the provisions of this section.
"(b) There is hereby posted a standing reward of $10 to be paid by
the State Highway Commission . . .for information leading to the arrest
and conviction of any person or persons willfully or maliciously violating
any provision of this section with respect to official signs upon the State
Highway system." ARK. STAT. § 75-508 (1947).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss2/10
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convenience of administration would be sufficiently increased
nor difficulty of proof sufficiently obviated to justify the imposi-
tion of absolute liability in a situation such as this where
grave injustice could easily result. But, even if the court is
correct in its interpretation of the Minnesota statute, there is
no compelling reason for the court to hold that a criminal
statute of the absolute liability type is applicable at all in a
civil action. As Professor Clarence Morris has indicated, only
those criminal statutes which are founded on a wrong-doing
theory should be considered applicable in a civil case unless
some other reason exists for shifting the loss.13 No such
reason is apparent here.
The Minnesota court also indicated that there could be lia-
bility on these facts even in the absence of the statute, i.e.,
liability based on common law negligence. It is difficult to
find any foreseeable risk of harm to any person merely from
overloading the cars or from failing to remove the drippings
as often as they could have been removed. In the absence of
foreseeability of some harm to some person, it would seem that
the conduct could not be characterized as negligent. 4
Since the statute does not seem to be one which results in
criminal guilt in the absence of a showing that the actor
intended to deface a sign, and since, even if the court were
correct in construing the statute as one imposing liability on the
basis of conduct alone there is no compelling reason for applying
such a statute in a civil case, it is submitted that the court erred
in allowing the jury to find negligence based on a breach of the
statute. It also appears that since there is no foreseeability
of any harm to any person, the court was in error in saying
that common law negligence could be found.
PAUL V. LuTz
TORTS-VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTE AS NEGLIGENCE Per Se
OR MERE EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
Defendant's truck-driver was driving along the highway with
the intention of turning left at an intersection. He failed to
yield the right of way to the plaintiff who approached from the
13. Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49
CoL. L. REv. 21 (1949).
14. PROSSER, TORTS 341 (1941).
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